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This paper uses panel data of OECD countries during the period 1995—
2003 to examine how corruption affects fertility. The Corruption 
Perceptions Index is used to measure the degree of corruption. Fixed 
effects IV estimation and the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation 
are employed to control for endogenous bias and unobservable country-
specific effects. Results suggest that the fertility rate is higher in less 
corrupted countries. From this, the argument can be made that lack of 
political corruption underlies desirable conditions for child rearing in 
developed countries. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
It is widely known that fertility rates have declined since World War II 
in most OECD countries. Consequently, rates are below 2.1 children 
per woman, which is the level required to secure generational 
replacement (Sleebos 2003; Vos 2009). Furthermore, some developing 
countries have followed this trend, and thus fertility rates have been 
drastically declining in those countries (Das Gupta 1999). A decline in 
fertility changes not only the structure of the family but also economic 
conditions. The GDP level partly depends on input factors such as 
labour and capital. A low fertility rate can reduce the working age 
population and in turn hamper economic growth. Researchers have 
explored why fertility declines with a rise in per capita income and 
institutional changes (e.g., Becker 1981; Docquier 2004; Vos 2009; Hori 
2011). It has been asserted that rising per capita income raises the 
fertility rate up to a point, and thereafter exerts a negative effect on 
fertility (Winegarden and Wheeler 1992). Contrarily, since the 1990s, 
the fertility rate has risen gradually for some developed countries, 
including the United States and countries in Scandinavia (Sleebos 
2003). This implies that fertility rates have deviated from a stable level 
for these countries. Naturally, a question arises regarding why the 
fertility rate varies even though the per capita income level is similar 
among developed countries. To address this question, existing work has 
focused on female labour force participation (e.g., Galor and Weil 1996; 
Apps and Rees 2004; Sleebos 2003; Kogel 2004) and cost of childcare 
services (Martinez and Iza 2004)
1. However, another plausible reason is 
that political institutions have an influence on the incentive to give 
birth, resulting in differences in fertility (Borck 2011).  
Institutional factors seem to influence demography (McNicoll and 
Mead 1989). For developing countries, the establishment of modern 
governance is conducive to fertility decline (Das Gupta 1999). With 
respect to developed countries, child bearing decisions depend partly 
on characteristics of labour markets (D’addio and d’Ercole 2005). The 
theoretical works of Blackburn and Sarmah (2008) used the dynamic 
generational equilibrium model to show that high levels of economic 
development are related to low levels of corruption and high rates of 
                                                 
1 Ahn and Mira (2002) found that in OECD countries, the correlation between fertility 
rate and female labour force participation was negative during the 1970s and up to the 
early 1980s. However, thereafter the correlation became positive. Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     36
life expectancy. It is well acknowledged that corruption is a critical 
factor influencing personal decision making and hence economic 
outcomes. If this is so, corruption inevitably influences the decision 
about giving birth and child rearing. However, little is known about 
how corruption is related to fertility rates among developed countries. 
Hence, this paper aims to examine how corruption influences fertility 
rate by using panel data of OECD countries. The key finding through 
various estimations is that the fertility rate is higher in less corrupted 
countries. 
The organisation of this paper is as follows. An explanation of the data 
set is provided as well as an overview of the relation between 
corruption and fertility in Section II. Section III presents the 
hypothesis and a simple econometric framework. The results of the 
estimations and discussion are provided in Section IV. The final section 
offers concluding observations.  
2 DATA 
This study uses a panel data set covering the 9-year period 1995—2003. 
22 OECD countries are included: Australia, Greece, Portugal, Austria, 
Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Finland, Netherlands, 
United States, France, New Zealand, Germany and Norway. The data 
are derived from several sources. Crude fertility rates are taken from 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010).  
The key independent variable of this paper is a proxy for degree of 
corruption. I use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
2. The CPI 
scale has values from 0 (highly corrupted) to 10 (least corrupted). 
That is, higher values on the CPI indicate less corruption. This index, 
which was launched in 1995, is published by Transparency 
International. The CPI has been widely used to measure cross-country 
corruption (for example, see Lambsdorff 2006). The CPI is a composite 
index, drawing on 15 different polls and surveys from nine independent 
institutions carried out among business people and country analysts, 
                                                 
2 An important issue is how to define corruption. There are many definitions, and 
most share a common denominator which can be expressed as follows: “the abuse of 
public authority or position for private gains.” The data are available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed February 
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including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate. The CPI 
focuses on corruption in the public sector. The surveys used in 
compiling the CPI ask questions in line with the misuse of public 
power for private benefit with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by 
public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish 
between administrative and political corruption.  
Among the set of other independent variables are income, divorce rate, 
unemployment rate and income inequality. As a measure of income, I 
use the per capita real gross domestic product in the year 2000 in 
international dollars taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT v 6.3)
3. 
Gini coefficients from the Standardised Income Distribution Database 
(SIDD) created by Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007)
4,5 are a 
proxy for income inequality. Harmonised unemployment rates are 
taken from the OECD database to allow for comparisons across 
countries. I also employ crude divorce rates (per 1,000) taken from the 
United Nations Common database, Demographic Yearbook
6. As 
explained later, I also use urban population rate and population 
density as instrumental variables for the fixed effects IV estimation. 
Urban population rate, population density and female labour force 
participation rate are from World Development Indicators (World 
Bank 2010). 
Table 1 includes variable definitions and descriptive statistics of the 
variables employed in the empirical analysis. As seen in Table 1, 
compared with INCOM and UNEMP, standard deviations of key 
variables such as FERTIL and CORRU are small. As explained, the 
data set consists of 22 countries and 8 years. Thus, results reflect 
considerable variation in each variable.  
In Figure 1(1), average fertility rate within a country between 1995 
and 2003 is shown on the vertical axis, while average value of the CPI 
is on the horizontal axis. Hence, Figure 1(1) reflects “between effects” 
of corruption on fertility among countries.    
                                                 
3 The data are available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
(accessed January 15, 2010). 
4 The SIDD adjusts the raw World Income Inequality Database (WIID) for differences 
in scope of coverage, income definition, and reference unit to a nationally 
representative, gross income, household per capita standard. 
5 The data are available at http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads (accessed 
March 1, 2011). 
6 Available at http://data.un.org/Default.aspx (Accessed May 10, 2010). Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     38
Figure 1(1). Association between average fertility rate and corruption 
 
Figure 1(2). Association between average fertility rate and corruption 
 
Notes: Figure 1(1) demonstrates the relation between average corruption level and 
fertility rate within a country during 1995—2004. The relations in Figure 1(2) are 
obtained after controlling for unobserved country-specific effects and are illustrated 
using the avplot command in STATA 11. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions, means and standard deviations 
Variables Definition  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
FERTIL Fertility  rate 1.60 0.25 
CORRU Degree  of  corruption 7.64 1.68 
INCOM  Per capita income (1000 US$) 28.6 83.9 
UNEMP  Unemployment rate (%) 6.78 3.22 
GINI Gini  coefficients 0.42 0.10 
DIV Divorce  rate  (%) 2.19 0.76 
FLAB  Female labor force participation rate (%) 43.3 3.08 
 Instrumental  variables  
DENS Population  density  (km
2) 144.2 143.8 
URBAN  Urban population rate (%) 76.0  12.2 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 2. The coefficient of 
correlation between FERTIL and CORRU is 0.58, suggesting they are 
positively correlated. 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) 
FERTIL (1) 1.00      
CORRU (2) 0.58 1.00      
INCOM (3) 034 0.32 1.00      
UNEMP (4) -0.32 -0.41 -0.55 1.00      
GINI (5)  0.07 -0.34 -0.02 0.16 1.00      
DIV (6)  0.61 0.59 0.37 -0.36 0.02 1.00    
FLAB (7)  0.65 0.78 0.26 -0.34 -0.2 0.68 1.00     
DENS (8)  -0.31 -0.19 0.01 -0.20 0.16 -0.1 -0.3  1.00   
URBAN (9) 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.06 0.32 0.49 0.24 -0.0  1.00
As shown in Figure 1(1), fertility rates vary considerably across 
countries. The highest fertility rates are about 2.0 in Iceland, Ireland, 
New Zealand and the United States. Scandinavian countries such as 
Norway and Finland have rates about 1.8, putting them in the next to 
highest group. The lowest fertility rates are around 1.2, found in South 
Korea, Italy and Spain. On the other hand, concerning corruption, 
Iceland, New Zealand and Scandinavian countries are in the highest 
group with a score of about 9. The lowest group, including Italy and 
South Korea, has a corruption score below 3. Overall, a cursory 
examination of Figure 1(1) reveals that the CPI is positively associated 
with fertility rate. This paper aims to examine effects of corruption on 
fertility rate after controlling for unobserved country-specific effects 
considered “between effects”, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, I now focus 
on Figure 1(2) which demonstrates the relationship after controlling for 
the “between effects”. That is, Figure 1(2) illustrates “within effects” of Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     40
CPI on fertility. In this figure, the positive relationship between CPI 
and fertility continues to be observed even after controlling for 
“between effects”. However, this relationship is not obvious. In the 
following section, I explain the regression estimations to more closely 
examine the relationship after controlling for country-specific effects. 
3 HYPOTHESIS AND MODEL  
3.1 Hypothesis 
The utility of parents partly depends on the level of utility of their 
child (Becker 1981). Hence, the higher the child’s utility becomes, the 
higher is the utility of the parents. Therefore, factors that influence a 
child’s utility are associated with the parents’ utility. If parents predict 
that a child’s attainable utility will be decreased because of conditions 
when they give birth, the incentive to give birth is reduced. Corruption 
appears to influence fertility rate because it can have an effect on a 
child’s utility. For example, the degree to which human capital can be 
formed, which determines a child’s earning ability, is thought to 
depend on public investment in education. The rate of public 
expenditures can be compromised by corrupt activities of government 
(Mauro 1998; Delavallade 2006). Therefore, a decrease in public 
expenditure for education leads to a decrease in fertility rate (Zhang 
and Zhang 2005). Furthermore, as argued by Blackburn and Sarmah 
(2008), life expectancy relies on the provision of public health, which is 
also reduced by corruption. A joint consideration of these studies 
suggests that corruption reduces the incentive of parents to give birth 
because the child is less likely to become a high earner and have 
longevity
7. Hence, I postulate this hypothesis: 
The fertility rate is lower in more corrupted countries.  
3.2 Model 
The empirical model to explain fertility rates and analyse the impact 
of corruption on fertility takes the following form:  
FERTILit = 1FERTILit-1+ 2 CORRUPT it + 3 INCOM it  
+  4 UNEMP it+ 5 GINI it + 6 DIVit + 7 FLABit + ki + it,   (1) 
                                                 
7 Zhang and Zhang (2005) argue that life expectancy reduces fertility, but raises the 
growth rate. Eiji Yamamura    41
where dependent variables in country i and year t are total suicide 
rates as FERTILit. ki and  it represent individual effects of country i (a 
fixed effect country vector) and the error term of country i and at year 
t, respectively. The structure of the data set used in this study is a 
panel; ki holds the time invariant feature and so can be captured by 
the random effects model (Baltagi 2005). The regression parameter is 
represented by  ;  it represents the error term. If CORRUPT takes 10, 
this indicates an absence of corruption. On the other hand, if 
CORRUPT takes 0, business transactions are entirely dominated by 
kickbacks, extortion and other corrupted practices. CORRUPT is 
included to capture the degree of governance corruption. If people are 
more likely to give birth in less corrupted societies, CORRUPT will 
take the positive sign.  
INCOM and UNEMP (unemployment) are included to capture 
economic factors. The anticipated sign of INCOM is negative. This is 
because the higher the income level becomes, the higher the 
opportunity cost of giving birth. We expect UNEMP and GINI to take 
the negative sign because higher unemployment and income inequality 
lead to crime. Therefore, children are exposed to danger. As a 
consequence, conditions related to child rearing become less desirable.  
When we discuss the fertility rate in developed countries, it is 
important to consider “trade-offs confronting individual women 
between having children, on one side, and taking advantage of the 
education and employment opportunities available to them, on the 
other” (Sleebos p. 19). Women’s decisions regarding fertility depend on 
the economic cost and benefit (Becker, 1981). Hence, a rise in wage 
level for women increases the opportunity cost of giving birth and 
childcare (Galor and Weil 1996). With higher female labour force 
participation, time that can be spent on childcare is scarcer, thus 
reducing women’s incentive to give birth. However, in OECD 
countries, the relation between fertility rate and female labour force 
participation rate was negative until the beginning of the 1980s, but 
has become positive since the 1990s (Sleebos 2003; Kogel 2004). 
Divorce destroys stable partnerships between males and females and 
thus reduces fertility rate. In OECD countries, fertility rate is 
negatively associated with divorce rate. However, at the end of the 
1990s births occurring outside marriage were increasing (Sleebos 2003). 
These changes in the effects of female labour force participation and 
divorce on fertility are open to discussion (Kogel 2004). Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     42
3.3 Endogeneity bias  
As argued, FLAB and DIV affect the fertility rate. On the other hand, 
it seems plausible that a female with a small child is less likely to 
participate in the labour force because she is providing childcare 
(Veronique at al. 2010). As seen in Table 2, the coefficient of 
correlation between FERTIL and FLAB is 0.65, implying that fertility 
rate is positively related to female labour force participation rate. This 
seems to reflect the situation in OECD countries after the 1990s
8. 
Having a child appears to reduce the likelihood of parental divorce 
because divorce has a detrimental effect on children (Sleebos 2003). 
Therefore, there is possibly reverse causality between FERTIL and 
FLAB (or DIV), and the causality between FLAB (or DIV) and 
FERTIL cannot be identified, resulting in endogeneity bias. For more 
precise estimation, instrumental variables are used to control for 
estimation bias.  
Various kinds of industries, especially those in the service sector, are 
concentrated in urban areas. Firms can enjoy the benefit of 
agglomeration economies through face to face interactions of experts in 
large cities, resulting in new ideas and new industry (Jacobs 1969, 
1984). Glaeser et al. (1992) found that the greater the scale of the city 
and the more diverse its industrial structure is, the higher the growth 
rate of employment. This leads me to infer that agglomeration 
(urbanisation) provides workplaces for females, increasing female 
labour force participation. Consequently, females can obtain high 
earnings, contributing to the divorce rate because they are more 
inclined to become economically independent. Therefore, as 
instrumental variables, I use population density (DENS) and urban 
population rate (URBAN), which capture agglomeration and 
urbanisation, respectively. 
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the relationship among various variables, 
after controlling for country dummies. Figures 2(1) and (2) 
demonstrate the relation between DENS and DIV, and between 
URBAN and DIV, respectively. 
   
                                                 
8 In OECD countries, there was a negative correlation between fertility rate and 
female labour force participation until the early 1980s. However, thereafter a positive 
correlation was observed (Ahn and Mira 2002).  Eiji Yamamura    43
Figure 2(1). Association between divorce rate and population density 
 
Figure 2(2). Association between divorce rate and urban population 
rate 
 
Notes: These relations are obtained after controlling for unobserved country-specific 
effects and are illustrated using the avplot command in STATA 11.  
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Figure 3(1). Association between female labour force participation rate 
and population density 
 
Figure 3(2). Association between female labour force participation rate 
and urban population rate 
 
Notes: These relations are obtained after controlling for unobserved country-specific 
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Figure 2(1) reveals that DENS is positively associated with DIV. 
Figure 2(2) shows that URBAN is positively associated with DIV. As 
for FLAB, a cursory examination of Figures 3(1) and (2) reveals a 
positive association between FLAB and DENS and between FLAB and 
URBAN. What is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 is in line with the 
prediction. Instrumental variables are valid only when they are related 
to the endogenous variables but not to the error term. Roughly, I 
examine the validity to look at the relation between FERTIL and 
DENS (or URBAN). 
Figures 4(1) and (2) demonstrate relations between the error term and 
instrumental variables, which are obtained after controlling for female 
labour participation rate, divorce rate and unobserved country-specific 
effects. Figure 4(1) shows that the slope of the fitted line is almost flat. 
Therefore, the error term is not related to DENS. Figure 4(2) reveals 
that the slope of the fitted line is also almost flat. Thus, the error term 
is not related to URBAN. All in all, DENS and URBAN are considered 
valid as instrumental variables.  
Figure 4(1). Association between fertility rate and population density 
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Figure 4(2). Association between fertility rate and urban population 
rate 
 
Notes: These relations are obtained after controlling for female labour force 
participation rate, divorce rate and unobserved country-specific effects and are 
illustrated using the avplot command in STATA 11.  
In addition to the fixed effects IV estimation which uses instrumental 
variables in the fixed effects model, I also employ the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel estimation which allows me to treat FLAB and DENS 
as endogenous variables. I use endogenous variables lagged two periods 
or more as additional instrumental variables (Arellano, 2003, p. 168). 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.1 Fixed effects and fixed effects IV estimations 
Estimation results of the fixed effects and fixed effects IV models are 
set out in Table 3(1). The fixed effects results appear in columns (1)—
(4) of Table 3(1); the fixed effects IV results are in columns (5)—(7). 
DENS and URBAN are used as instrumental variables in columns (5) 
and (6). In addition, the log form of DENS and that of URBAN are 
used in column (7). An over-identification test examines the null 
hypothesis that instrumental variables are not correlated with the 
error term. If the hypothesis is not rejected, instrumental variables can 
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valid. As shown in columns (5) and (6), the hypothesis is not rejected, 
indicating that the fixed effects IV method is valid.  
Table 3(1): Dependent variable is FERTILt,: (Fixed effects and fixed 
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groups  22  22  22 22 21 21 21 
Observations 170  166 170 166 159 163  159 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Luxembourg is not included in the sample 
used for estimation in columns (5)—(7) because instrumental variables were not 
available. 
In all estimations of Table 3(1), CORRU yields the positive sign, while 
being statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the 
absolute value of its coefficient is 0.01. This implies that a 1 point 
increase in the corruption index leads to an increase in the fertility rate 
of 0.01 point. Apart from CORRU, UNEMP produces the negative 
sign in all estimations and is statistically significant in columns (1), (2) Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     48
and (4). Signs for GINI are negative in all estimations and statistically 
significant with the exception of column (5). This suggests that 
unemployment and income inequality reduce the fertility rate, 
consistent with the prediction. As for endogenous variables such as 
DIV and FLAB, their signs are not stable and statistically 
insignificant.  
Table 3(2). Dependent variables are DIVt, and FLABt : (Fixed effects 

























































Observations 159  163 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
The results of the first stage of the fixed effects IV are displayed in 
Table 3(2). The determinants of DIV and FLAB are shown in columns 
(1) and (2), respectively. As expected, signs of DENS and URBAN are 
positive. URBAN is statistically significant in column (1); DENS is 
statistically significant in column (2). All in all, endogeneity of DIV 
and FLAB can be controlled by instrumental variables. Hence, the 
effect of CORRU on FERTIL is robust and unbiased. Eiji Yamamura    49
When DIV and FLAB are included in independent variables at the 
same time, I use not only DENS and URBAN, but also ln(DENS) and 
ln(URBAN). However, the choice of ln(DENS) and ln(URBAN) is not 
based on theoretical reason. Therefore, the IV method might not be 
fully supported, although the over-identification test shows validity of 
the IV method in column (7). I also conduct dynamic panel estimation 
for a robustness check of the results presented above and discuss the 
results in subsection 4.2. 
4.2 Dynamic panel estimation 
Estimation results of the dynamic panel model (two step estimation) 
are presented in Table 4. Columns (1)—(4) exhibit results where all 
independent variables are treated as exogenous. On the other hand, 
columns (5)—(7) provide results where DIV and FLAB are treated as 
endogenous, and therefore endogeneity bias is controlled for. 
Furthermore, Table 4 presents the results of Sargan’s over-
identification test and second-order serial correlation test (Arellano 
2003). These tests are necessary to check the validity of the estimation 
results in the dynamic panel model. The null hypothesis of Sargan’s 
over-identification test is that the instrumental variables do not 
correlate with the residuals. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the 
instrumental variables are valid. Furthermore, the test for the null 
hypothesis (that there is no second-order serial correlation with 
disturbances in the first-difference equation) is important because the 
estimator is consistent when there is no second-order serial correlation. 
Tables 4 shows that both hypotheses are not rejected in all 
estimations, suggesting that the estimation results are valid. 
CORRU yields positive signs and is statistically significant in all 
estimations. The value of CORRU is 0.01. These results are the same 
as the results shown in Table 3(1), implying that the significant 
positive effect of CORRU on FERTIL is robust. Concerning other 
independent variables, UNEMP takes significant negative signs, with 
the exception of column (6). Significant negative signs for GINI are 
observed in columns (1)—(4). Results for UNEMP and GINI are similar 
to those exhibited in Table 3(1). DIV produces significant negative 
signs with the exception of column (7), in line with the prediction, 
implying that divorce reduces the fertility rate. However, signs of 
FLAB are not stable and statistically insignificant, very similar to the 
results provided in column 3(1). In my interpretation, as observed in Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     50
Sleebos (2003), female labour force participation has negative and 
positive effects on fertility rate, causing the effects to be neutralised. 















































































































































groups  22  22  22 22 22 22 22 
Observations  146  142  146 142 142 146 142 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
The two-step estimation of the dynamic panel caused the standard 
errors to be biased. Hence, for more closely examining the effects of 
CORRU, I conduct one-step dynamic panel estimations and exhibit 
these results in Table 5. To conserve space, I only present the results 
of CORRU although other independent variables, such as Ln(INCOM), 
UNEMP, GINI, DIV, and FLAB, are included in each estimation. DIV 
and FLAB are treated as exogenous for results reported in columns 
(1)—(4), whereas they are treated as endogenous for results in columns 
(5) and (6). Only the first lagged FERTIL are included as independent Eiji Yamamura    51
variables in columns (1) and (5). The first and second lagged FERTIL 
are included as independent variables in columns (2) and (6). The first, 
second and third lagged FERTIL are included as independent variables 
in columns (3) and (7). The first, second, third and fourth lagged 
FERTIL are included as independent variables in columns (4) and (8). 
The null hypothesis regarding no second-order serial correlation with 
disturbances in the first-difference equation is not rejected with the 
exception of columns (3) and (7). However, it should be noted that 
only results of column (8) pass both the second-order serial correlation 
test and Sargan’s test. Therefore, careful attention is called for when 
estimation results are interpreted. CORRU yields significant positive 
signs in all estimations, which is consistent with results shown in 
Tables 3(1) and 4. Furthermore, values of coefficients are between 
0.01—0.04. This suggests that a 1 point increase of CPI leads to a 0.01—
0.04 increase in fertility rate. 































































































22  21 21 21 22 21 21 21 
Observations  142  122 102 82  142 122 102 82 
Notes: The same set of independent variables used in columns (4) and (7) of Table 4 is 
included, but to save space not reported. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Z-statistics are 
calculated using robust standard error. 
As a whole, combined results set out in Tables 3—5 strongly support 
the hypothesis that the fertility rate is lower in more corrupted 
countries. Furthermore, I argue that quality of governance has a 
critical influence on child bearing decisions. A rise in fertility rate has 
been observed in Scandinavian countries (Sleebos 2003). There are a 
number of reasons why the fertility rate is higher in developed Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2.     52
countries, for example, cash transfers (or tax deductions) for families 
with children and characteristics of the labour market (D’Addio and 
d’Ercole 2005). In addition, lack of government corruption is 
considered to be an important factor in increasing fertility rate in 
OECD countries. 
Political conditions and economic development are thought to be 
profoundly related (Lipset 1959). Researchers have stressed the role 
played by politically and historically formed institutions and 
considered the effect on economic outcomes (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001, 
2002; Greif 2006). Institutions are considered to underlie policies that 
enhance economic growth. Previous works have examined the relation 
between institutions and economic development (e.g., Przeworski and 
Limongi, 1993; Glaeser et al. 2004). A growing number of works have 
explored the relation between corruption and growth (e.g., Mauro 
1995; Del Monte and Papagni 2001; Toke et al. 2008; Shaw et al. 
2011). There are various channels through which corruption influences 
economic growth. This paper reveals another channel: corruption 
decreases fertility rate, reducing quantity of labour and in turn 
hampering economic growth even in OECD countries. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
As generally known, fertility rates have declined and reached low levels 
in developed countries (Sleebos 2003; Vos 2009). Given this situation, 
it is important to investigate what encourages a rise in fertility levels. 
Since the 1990s, the fertility rate has risen gradually for some 
developed countries such as those in Scandinavia (Sleebos 2003). 
Understanding the rise in fertility rate in these countries may be the 
key to addressing this issue. Scandinavian countries are characterised 
by high trust and less corrupted governments, which facilitates the 
sustainable existence of a welfare state (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011). 
Good governance is important for improvement in health conditions 
(Klomp and De Haan 2008). Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that 
good governance is related to life expectancy, affecting population size 
and composition of generations. Blackburn and Sarmah (2008) showed 
that high levels of economic development are related to low levels of 
corruption and high rates of life expectancy. However, little is known 
about how governance is associated with fertility. 
Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate how and the extent to which 
corruption affects fertility rate. To this end, this paper sheds light on Eiji Yamamura    53
government corruption by using panel data of OECD countries to 
examine the effect of corruption on fertility. Labour force participation 
and divorce were expected to influence fertility rate. Thus, they were 
included as independent variables. However, these variables caused 
endogeneity bias. To alleviate this bias, the fixed effects IV estimation 
and the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation were employed. 
These methods also controlled for unobservable country-specific effects. 
Results from these regression models provide evidence that there is a 
higher fertility rate in less corrupted countries. It follows from this that 
lack of political corruption underlies desirable circumstances for child 
rearing in developed countries. Findings in this paper lead me to argue 
that the degree of government corruption in part explains why the 
fertility rate has increased in Scandinavian countries since the 1990s. 
Even within developed countries such as those in the OECD, fertility 
rate varies according to governance. As argued previously, corruption 
reduces not only productive investments such as education but also 
fertility rate, which in turn impedes economic growth in the long run. 
Human capital formation and size of the labour force is hampered by 
corrupted government. That is, corruption has a detrimental effect not 
only on the quality of labour measured, but also on quantity of labour. 
If this is so, corruption appears to make a difference in economic 
growth among developed countries. From the finding of this paper I 
derive the argument that policy makers in the OECD countries should 
consider the channel through which corruption reduces incentive to 
give a birth and so eradicate the corruption of public sector in order to 
provide the desirable circumstances for child rearing. Furthermore, 
international cooperation is required to support the policy to eradicate 
the corruption. 
The evidence presented above is based on data from OECD countries. 
For a closer examination, and to reconsider and scrutinise the results 
here, it is necessary to use individual level data. Furthermore, this 
paper does not explore precisely the mechanism by which corruption 
influences government expenditure and in turn affects fertility rate. 
Hence, it seems of value to explore the channel through which 
corruption reduces the incentive to give birth. These are issues 
remaining to be addressed in future research.  
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